

Big Picture:

A federal immigration detention facility has been operating at 100 Midland Avenue in Glenwood Springs for approximately twenty years without the basic city safety permit required for any commercial building. The City's own inspection in February 2026 found that the emergency lights did not work, the sprinkler system had not been tested in roughly twenty years, and there was no valid fire evacuation plan for the people held inside, who are kept in full mechanical restraints and cannot walk out of the building in an emergency.

The City has known about these problems since at least February 2026, and in some cases since 2025, when its own fire department issued two formal enforcement orders that went unenforced for nine months. Rather than ordering the facility closed, the City issued a repair list and allowed detention to continue. As recently as April 10, 2026 the Director of Community Development stated in a direct communication that no certificate of occupancy has been issued.

The City Attorney overseeing the City's response, Karl Hanlon, personally signed the facility's original permit authorization in 2004 while multiple safety conditions were still unresolved. He has not disclosed this history to the public or to the City Council. He has structured the upcoming April 28, 2026 enforcement hearing to address only one narrow question, excluding the building safety failures entirely.

This document presents what the City's own records show, what the law requires, and what the Collective is asking the City to do. Every fact is drawn from the City's own documents and publicly available records.

COMPLIANCE DEMANDS

The following actions are required by the City's adopted building and fire codes. They are the same actions the City would be required to take for any other Group I-3 detention occupancy under equivalent conditions. A full explanation of each demand appears in Part VI.

- I. **Issue a closure order for Suites 110 and 210.** The legally required response under IBC Section 116.1 is cessation of occupancy until a final Certificate of Occupancy is obtained through a complete independent inspection applying Group I-3 standards.
- II. **Release the full February 25, 2026 inspection record.** The post-inspection letter to the tenant is not a substitute for the complete report, field notes, photographs, and fire marshal's written assessment.
- III. **Release the May 2003 Planning and Zoning hearing minutes.** Including the record of any commissioner vote or participation in SUP No. 4-04 approval.
- IV. **Require Karl Hanlon to make a formal conflict-of-interest disclosure.** The City Attorney has direct professional ties to every stage of the facility's original authorization.
- V. **Retain independent outside counsel immediately.** Hanlon's personal history with this facility, his firm's regional municipal client portfolio, and his narrowing of the April 28 hearing scope collectively disqualify him from providing independent legal advice on this matter.
- VI. **Conduct an independent Group I-3 building inspection.** The inspector must have no prior professional or personal relationship with any official involved in the 2003 to 2005 approval or subsequent compliance history.
- VII. **Conduct a full Special Use Permit review for changed conditions.** Every material element of the 2003 compatibility determination has changed. A full review before the Planning and Zoning Commission, with public notice and community comment, is required by UDC Title 070.
- VIII. **Account for the people detained.** Provide, to the extent records exist, a complete count of individuals detained at this facility during its twenty-year operation and a statement of what oversight, if any, was exercised.

Summary:

In March 2026, the City of Glenwood Springs publicly acknowledged that an ICE detention facility at 100 Midland Avenue, Suite 210, has operated without a valid Certificate of Occupancy for approximately twenty years. The City has not produced any record of conducting a single fire safety inspection of the facility during that period. The City's official characterization of this compliance failure is that it represents a "clerical or administrative oversight."

This press release presents the documented facts that bear on that characterization. Every assertion is drawn from the City's own records, its February 25, 2026 post-inspection letter, Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) and federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) data, the City's building permit file for 100 Midland Avenue, published inspection findings, and primary source reporting. All sources are cited and independently verifiable.

A clerical oversight is a missing signature on a document that otherwise reflects completed, compliant work. What the record shows is categorically different: the complete absence of any documented compliance activity across twenty years. No final Certificate of Occupancy. No annual fire safety inspection for any year between 2004 and 2025. No monthly emergency lighting test logs. No sprinkler inspection records. No documented contact with the tenant about code compliance during the entire period. The Temporary Certificate of Occupancy expired by its own terms on September 1, 2005. From that date forward, every person detained in Suites 110 and 210 was held in a space the City had no legal authorization to permit for occupancy and had not inspected once.

The City's own building permit file confirms the severity of the gap. The Building Permit Conditions List for Permit No. 04-0113 (Plan Check No. 04-5054) contains more than twenty pages of mandatory conditions, including fire department requirements (items F-1 through F-22), Group I Occupancy provisions specific to detention use (items IO-1 through IO-18), exiting requirements (items X-1 through X-50), and accessibility standards. These conditions were the framework for final inspection and Certificate of Occupancy issuance. The contractor or owner signed a written acknowledgment of these conditions on June 2, 2004. Two separate handwritten notations in the file, dated May 10 and May 17, 2004, explicitly require "Exterior Lighting Details Required Prior to Final Inspection." Twenty-one years later, the City's February 2026 inspection found the exit and emergency lighting non-functioning. The condition flagged in 2004 as a prerequisite for final signoff was never resolved.

The building permit header page is dispositive on the question of what the City knew. The conditions list cover sheet classifies the Occupancy as "B/I-3": Group B for the office component, Group I-3 for the detention component. Group I-3 is the highest life-safety classification in the International Building Code, reserved for facilities where occupants are under physical restraint and cannot freely self-evacuate. The City's own building department wrote this classification onto the permit, confirming that it understood, at every level of its regulatory apparatus, that this was not an office. The permit also identifies the construction type as "Type II-N," which carries zero hours of fire-resistance rating for structural elements, the lowest possible rating. Whether that construction type is adequate for a Group I-3 detention occupancy was a code compliance question that should have been resolved before a final Certificate of Occupancy issued. It was never resolved. Every I-3 requirement on the twenty-page conditions list was predicated on the City's own classification. Not one was ever signed off through a final inspection.

New evidence obtained since the initial public reporting reinforces these conclusions. On March 5, 2025, Parachute Fire Protection inspected the sprinkler system at 100 Midland Avenue and identified four deficiencies, all classified at the highest severity level: "Impairment." The Glenwood Springs Fire Department issued a formal Order to Comply (NID 9290456) on approximately March 14, 2025. When no proof of correction was received, Fire Marshal Robin Pitt issued a Second Notice/Order to Comply (NID 9683590) on May 12, 2025. Neither order was complied with. The City allowed the facility to continue operating for approximately nine more months before the February 2026 re-inspection found the same conditions.

The original application made representations to the City that have been materially exceeded. The May 7, 2003 letter from GSA Contract Realty Specialist Russell Fury to City Planner Jill Peterson indicated that detainees would be held for "no more than 12 hours" and that the facility would serve approximately 60 persons: 5 employees and approximately 55 detainees. The application disclosed that the space would be shared with TRIDENT, the multi-agency drug task force that was the predecessor to the current SPEAR operation. Today, the ICE Nationwide Hold Room Waiver memorandum dated June 24, 2025 authorizes hold times of up to 72 hours per detainee, six times the duration represented to the City at the time of approval.

The original contractor's records no longer exist. Joe Mueller of Mueller Construction, the general contractor who performed the 2004 tenant buildout, closed his construction business in 2025 and has no records from the Midland project. Lessor Jeffrey W. Gillespie of JG Housing Solutions LLC reported this on February 24, 2026, relayed through GSA Lease Management Specialist Jarred Workman. Independent verification of whether the original construction met the extensive permit conditions is now impossible. The lessor operates from out of state. The contractor's records are gone. The City's own file does not contain a final Certificate of Occupancy confirming that compliance was ever verified.

The facility was built for the purpose of detention. Fortified jail cells hold people who are physically restrained and cannot self-evacuate in an emergency. The International Building Code classifies such spaces at its highest life-safety level, Group I-3. That classification exists because the government, having removed a person's ability to escape, assumes an absolute obligation to maintain the life-safety infrastructure that replaces it. When the City finally inspected this space in February 2026, it found non-functioning emergency lighting, a sprinkler system untested for approximately twenty years, unpatched structural penetrations above a heat source, and no evacuation plan for restrained occupants. These are not the conditions of a space that was properly closed out. They are the conditions of a space that was never brought into compliance and then abandoned by the regulatory authority responsible for overseeing it.

The official characterizing this history as a clerical oversight has direct professional ties to every stage of the facility's original authorization. City Attorney Karl Hanlon served as City Attorney from 2000 to 2005. His signature appears on the Special Use Permit, dated May 17, 2004. The City's own file shows that when he signed, the evacuation plan condition had been documented as outstanding twelve days earlier, the building official had flagged an exterior lighting requirement as unmet seven days earlier, and the contractor had not yet acknowledged the building permit conditions. Hanlon has made no public disclosure of these relationships. At the March 19, 2026 City Council meeting, he announced that he would personally manage the enforcement process, including a hearing he scheduled for April 28, 2026, while instructing Council members not to engage with public speakers on the matter.

This Collective refuses the City's characterization. The record does not support it. What follows is an explanation of why, grounded in codes the City has adopted, facts the City has acknowledged, and facts the City has chosen not to disclose.


Under Glenwood Springs Municipal Code Section 060.010, no person may occupy a commercial space without a valid Certificate of Occupancy. Each day of occupancy without a valid Certificate of Occupancy is a separate violation.

The City has known, since at least February 25, 2026, that no valid Certificate of Occupancy exists for Suites 110 and 210. It documented that fact in its own letter. It chose not to issue a closure order. It chose instead to issue a repair list and allow occupancy to continue.

From the date the City made that choice, every day of continued detention at 100 Midland Avenue is not a legacy violation inherited from an administrative gap. It is a new, affirmative violation that the City is generating in real time, with full knowledge, by choosing not to

exercise the mandatory authority the IBC and GSMC place in the building official's hands.

The Temporary Certificate of Occupancy expired September 1, 2005. From that date through March 25, 2026, the facility has operated in violation of GSMC Section 060.010 for approximately 7,510 days. Every day the City permits occupancy to continue after its written acknowledgment that no Certificate of Occupancy exists is a violation. The City is not merely failing to stop; it is a violation the City is knowingly choosing to extend. The City possesses actual written knowledge of restrained occupants in a space with documented, uncured Group I-3 life-safety deficiencies. It has not issued a closure order,



Artist rendering of Glenwood Springs Hold Room



Definitions

The following terms are used throughout this document with specific legal and technical meanings.

- **Certificate of Occupancy (CO):** A document issued by the City’s building official certifying that a building or space has been inspected, found to follow all applicable codes, and is authorized for a specific use and occupant load. Required under GSMC Section 060.010 before any person may occupy a commercial space.
- **Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (TCO):** A time-limited provisional authorization issued when construction is substantially complete but minor non-life-safety items remain. It carries an expiration date and is not a substitute for a final CO.
- **Special Use Permit (SUP):** A conditional land use authorization issued by the Planning and Zoning Commission for uses that carry heightened potential to affect surrounding properties, infrastructure, traffic, or public safety. It is not a vested right; it is a condition-specific, site-specific approval. In Glenwood Springs, GSMC Title 070 (Development Code), Article 070.060 governs SUPs.
- **Group I-3 Occupancy:** Under IBC Section 308.5, a building or space in which more than five persons are under restraint or security and cannot freely self-evacuate. The key phrase is “incapable of self-preservation due to security measures not under the occupants’ control.” This is the highest life-safety classification in the International Building Code. It includes detention centers, jails, correctional centers, and prisons.
- **I-3 Condition Levels (1 through 5):** I-3 occupancies are subdivided by the degree to which occupants’ movement is restricted. Condition 1 permits free movement to the exterior. Condition 5, the most restrictive, restricts all free movement and requires staff-controlled manual release, an automatic sprinkler system throughout, and automatic smoke detection throughout. The 100 Midland facility is at minimum Condition 4 or 5.
- **Type II-N Construction:** Under the 1997 Uniform Building Code (the code in effect at the time of the building permit for 100 Midland Avenue), Type II-N designates non-combustible construction with no required fire-resistance rating for structural elements. This is the lowest fire-resistance rating available for non-combustible construction. It means the structural frame, bearing walls, floor construction, and roof construction carry zero hours of rated fire protection. Type II-N is typically associated with low-hazard commercial and business occupancies. Whether it is adequate for a Group I-3 detention occupancy depends on floor area, number of stories, and the presence of compensating systems (automatic sprinklers, fire alarm, smoke compartmentalization). The building permit header page for 100 Midland Avenue lists the construction type as Type II-N.
- **Smoke Compartment:** A space within a building enclosed by smoke barriers on all sides, including the top and bottom. IBC Section 408.6 requires I-3 occupancies to be divided into at least two smoke compartments, each capable of evacuating inmates within 6 minutes.
- **International Building Code (IBC):** The model building code adopted by the City of Glenwood Springs through GSMC Title 060. The current adopted edition is the 2021 IBC.
- **International Fire Code (IFC):** The model fire code adopted by the City. It establishes mandatory fire inspection authority and fire protection system maintenance standards.
- **NFPA 13:** The National Fire Protection Association standard for installing and maintaining automatic sprinkler systems.
- **NFPA 25:** The NFPA standard governing the inspection, testing, and maintenance of water-based fire protection systems, including sprinkler systems, standpipes, and backflow prevention devices.
- **Order to Comply (NID):** A formal enforcement notice issued through the City’s Bryccr Compliance Engine platform, identifying code deficiencies and requiring corrective action within a specified timeframe.
- **Impairment:** In fire protection compliance, the highest severity classification for a deficiency, indicating that the fire protection system may not function as designed in an emergency.
- **CORA:** Colorado Open Records Act, C.R.S. Section 24-72-200.1 et seq. State law requires public agencies to make records available for public inspection.
- **SPEAR Task Force:** The Special Problem Enforcement and Response task force, a multi-agency law enforcement operation based in Garfield County. It replaced the TRIDENT task force referenced in the original 2003 SUP application.
- **Sally Port:** A secure, controlled entry point for vehicles transporting detainees into a detention facility, designed to prevent observation from the public and to prevent escape during transfer.
- **Cold Soldering:** A fire suppression design deficiency in which sprinkler heads are placed too closely together, causing the thermal discharge of one head to cool the fusible link of the adjacent head and prevent it from activating. This results in partial or total failure of the suppression zone.
- **GSMC:** Glenwood Springs Municipal Code.
- **Life-Safety Systems:** The building components and installations whose purpose is to protect occupants from injury or death in an emergency, particularly fire. As used in the IBC and the GSMC framework, the term covers: (1) detection and alarm, including fire alarm systems, smoke detectors, and manual pull stations; (2) suppression, including automatic sprinkler systems and standpipes; (3) egress, including exit doors, exit corridors, exit stairways, exit signage, and panic hardware; (4) emergency lighting, including battery-backed or generator-backed lighting that illuminates exit paths when normal power fails; (5) structural fire resistance, including fire-rated walls, floors, ceilings, and doors that compartmentalize the building to slow fire and smoke spread; and (6) mechanical systems with life-safety functions, including smoke control and pressurization systems and fire dampers. The building permit conditions list for Permit No. 04-0113 specifically required verification of fire suppression, fire alarm, emergency lighting, exiting, and structural fire-resistance before a final CO could issue. These are not amenities or cosmetic features. They are the systems that keep people alive in an emergency.
- **Building Permit Conditions List:** The document issued by the City’s building department at the time of plan check, identifying every code requirement that must be verified through inspection before a final Certificate of Occupancy may be issued. For Permit

No. 04-0113 (Plan Check No. 04-5054), the conditions list spans more than twenty pages and includes fire department requirements (F-1 through F-22), Group I Occupancy provisions specific to detention use (IO-1 through IO-18), exiting requirements (X-1 through X-50), and accessibility standards. The header page identifies the Occupancy Classification as B/I-3, the Construction Type as II-N, the Floor Area as 6,298 square feet, and the Valuation as \$285,990. The contractor or owner signed a written acknowledgment of these conditions on June 2, 2004.

The Legal Framework:

1.1 The Dual Approval Mandate

Under the Glenwood Springs Municipal Code, lawful commercial operation requires two distinct municipal authorizations. The first is a *land use approval*, governing the specific activity permitted at the property. The second is an *occupancy approval*, certifying the physical safety of the structure for that specific activity. The City holds exclusive jurisdiction over both. That jurisdiction does not yield to the identity of the tenant or the nature of the governmental interest involved.

These two approvals serve fundamentally different functions. Land use authorization establishes *what* may occur at a location. Occupancy authorization establishes that the physical space is *safe* for that use to occur. Both must be valid simultaneously. Neither substitutes for the other.

1.1. Land Use Authorization: The Special Use Permit

A. What a Special Use Permit Is

For commercial uses with heightened impacts on surrounding properties, traffic, infrastructure, or public safety, the Municipal Code requires a Special Use Permit before the use may begin. A Special Use Permit is not a permanent, vested property right. It is a conditional, site-specific authorization, predicated entirely on the facts presented at the time of application and evaluated through a public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission.

The Commission considers whether the proposed use will be compatible with the surrounding area; whether its impacts have been adequately minimized; whether it conforms with the Municipal Code, the Comprehensive Plan, and other City plans and policies; and whether it minimizes adverse impacts to the health, safety, and welfare of surrounding inhabitants and the city at large. Each of these criteria must be satisfied based on the conditions that exist at the time of review.

After approval, the Community Development Department and Legal Department prepare the permit document then signed by both the applicant and the City. It becomes the governing land use authorization for the property, subject to all conditions imposed at the time of approval.

B. The 2003 Authorization for Detention at Suite 210

On May 27, 2003, the Planning and Zoning Commission approved Planning Item 22-03, Special Use Permit No. 4-04, authorizing a detention center in Suite 210 at 100 Midland Avenue. The approval was based on a specific set of factual representations submitted by applicant Russell Fury in his May 7, 2003 letter to City Planner Jill Peterson.

Fury described the proposed facility as an "office, processing and detention center" for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He represented that the existing temporary facility did "not have the capability to hold detainees," and that detainees were at the time processed in less secure facilities including local police stations, garages, Department of Transportation rest areas, and public areas along Interstate 70. The new facility was presented as a significant improvement in both security and capacity.

Critically, the application included the following operational parameters: processing time of one to ten hours, with an absolute maximum holding time of twelve hours; a single holding room with maximum male occupancy of approximately 20 and female occupancy of approximately 35; a total facility population of approximately 60 persons, comprising 5 employees and approximately 55 detainees; and shared use of the space with TRIDENT, the multi-agency drug enforcement task force that was the predecessor to the current SPEAR Task Force.

Each of these representations formed part of the factual basis on which the Commission evaluated and approved the SUP. The City knew exactly what it was authorizing: a facility designed to physically secure and restrain human beings, under specific operational limitations, in the corridor conditions that existed in 2003.

III. Occupancy Authorization: The Certificate Of Occupancy

A. What a Certificate of Occupancy Is

A Certificate of Occupancy is the municipality's formal certification that a building or space has been inspected, found to comply with all applicable building and fire codes, and is safe for the specific use and occupant load described. Under Glenwood Springs Municipal Code Section 060.010, no person may occupy a commercial space without a valid Certificate of Occupancy. Each day of occupancy without a valid CO constitutes a separate violation.

The International Building Code, adopted by Glenwood Springs, requires the City's building official to close any space that lacks valid occupancy authorization. State and local fire codes require the City's fire marshal to inspect commercial occupancies annually. These are mandatory, non-discretionary legal obligations.

B. What a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy Is

A Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (“TCO”) is a time-limited provisional authorization, issued when construction is substantially complete but minor items remain outstanding. It is not a substitute for a final CO. It includes an expiration date and creates an affirmative obligation on both the property owner and the municipality to pursue final certification before it lapses.

C. The TCO for 100 Midland Avenue: Issued, Expired, Never Replaced

The Temporary Certificate of Occupancy for 100 Midland Avenue, Suite 210, was issued December 14, 2004, and extended to September 1, 2005. It expired on that date. No final Certificate of Occupancy was ever issued.

The City’s own records confirm this. Community Development Director Trent Hyatt’s February 25, 2026 post-inspection letter states:

"We are unable to determine that a full certificate of occupancy was issued following a thorough review of the files associated with the entirety of the building."

The building permit file confirms the scope of what was supposed to be verified before final certification. The permit conditions for Permit No. 04-0113 span more than twenty pages, addressing every major life-safety system in the building: fire suppression, fire alarm, emergency lighting, emergency exiting, structural fire-resistance, plumbing, mechanical, electrical, accessibility, and Group I Occupancy-specific provisions. Handwritten notations in the file, dated May 10 and May 17, 2004, specifically identify exterior lighting compliance as a prerequisite for final signoff. That signoff never occurred.

Twenty-one years later, the City’s February 2026 inspection found exit and emergency lighting non-functioning.

IV. The Regulatory Disconnect: Approved As Detention, Regulated As An Office

This is where the City abandoned its legal obligations. The zoning department authorized a detention facility: a use that involves the physical restraint of human beings who cannot freely leave the premises in an emergency. The City’s own building department confirmed this understanding at the permit stage. The Building Permit Conditions List header page for Permit No. 04-5054 classifies the Occupancy as “B/I-3,” the dual classification that identifies both the office component (Group B) and the detention component (Group I-3). Buildings that restrain occupants are classified under the International Building Code as Group I-3 Occupancies and require drastically heightened fire-resistance ratings, specialized emergency egress systems, and rigorous fire suppression infrastructure, supervised fire alarm with automatic smoke detection, smoke compartmentalization, and emergency lighting on backup power, precisely because the occupants cannot freely flee.

Despite classifying this space as I-3 on its own permit approving this use, the City’s building and fire officials spent the next twenty years regulating the space with the laxity of a standard business office. No final Certificate of Occupancy was ever issued. No mandatory annual fire inspection was documented over two decades. No building official exercised the mandatory closure authority required under IBC Section 116.1 for a space operating without valid occupancy authorization. No fire marshal enforced the annual inspection duties required for commercial occupancies. The City wrote “I-3” on the building permit and then treated the space as if it had written “B.”

The City approved a use that demands the highest level of life-safety scrutiny, and then applied the lowest level of regulatory oversight. The result is a detention facility that has operated for approximately twenty years without any valid occupancy authorization, with unverified and now demonstrably non-functioning life-safety systems.

V. The City’s Mandatory Enforcement Obligations

The City of Glenwood Springs is the regulatory authority with exclusive jurisdiction over building, fire, and land use compliance within city limits. Its enforcement obligations are not discretionary. The building official holds mandatory authority under IBC Section 116.1 to issue closure orders for unsafe structures. The fire marshal holds mandatory annual inspection authority over commercial occupancies. These obligations exist regardless of the tenant’s identity or the nature of the governmental interest involved.

The City approved the Special Use Permit in 2003. It issued the building permit in 2004. It issued the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy in 2004. It said TCO expired in 2005. It then conducted no documented inspection for twenty years while a detention facility operated with lapsed occupancy authorization and deteriorating life-safety systems.

The failure to exercise mandatory inspection and enforcement authority over two decades, while a facility that physically restrains human beings operated without valid occupancy authorization and with non-functioning emergency lighting, unverified fire suppression, and unverified fire alarm systems, constitutes a severe abdication of municipal duty. The City cannot claim ignorance of the use: its own 2003 Special Use Permit explicitly authorized it.

VI. THE ONLY LAWFUL COURSE OF ACTION: IMMEDIATE CLOSURE

The regulatory record compels a single conclusion. The detention facility at 100 Midland Avenue, Suite 210, is currently operating without any valid occupancy authorization. The Temporary Certificate of Occupancy expired in September 2005. No final Certificate of Occupancy has been issued. The City’s own 2026 inspection confirms non-functioning life-safety systems that were prerequisite to final certification over twenty years ago.

Under Municipal Code Section 060.010, each day of occupancy without a valid Certificate of Occupancy is a separate violation. Under IBC Section 116.1, the building official is required to order the closure of any structure that lacks valid occupancy authorization. Under

state and local fire codes, the fire marshal is required to ensure the safety of commercial occupancies through annual inspection, a duty that has gone unexercised for two decades.

The only action consistent with the City's own code, the adopted building code, and the City's non-discretionary enforcement obligations is the immediate cessation of all detention operations at 100 Midland Avenue, Suite 210, pending:

- A comprehensive inspection and verification of all life-safety systems identified in the building permit conditions for Permit No. 04-0113, including fire suppression, fire alarm, emergency lighting, emergency egress, structural fire-resistance, and all Group I Occupancy-specific provisions;
- The issuance of a valid Certificate of Occupancy for detention use by the City's building official, certifying that the space meets all applicable code requirements for a facility that physically restrains occupants;
- A determination by the Planning and Zoning Commission as to whether the 2003 Special Use Permit remains valid under current conditions, or whether changed conditions in the surrounding corridor since 2003 require a new land use review; and
- The exhaustion of all administrative review and appeal processes associated with any of the foregoing determinations.

No other outcome is consistent with the law. The City cannot lawfully permit the continued operation of a detention facility that lacks valid occupancy authorization, that has not been inspected in twenty years, and whose life-safety systems are confirmed non-functional. The Special Use Permit approved in 2003 did not, and could not, authorize two decades of occupancy without inspection, without a valid Certificate of Occupancy, and with non-functioning emergency systems. The use cannot be grandfathered. GSMC Section 070.030.030 provides that noncompliance with applicable laws "shall be justification for revocation of any permits issued by the City." The word "shall" is mandatory. GSMC Section 060.010 provides that each day of occupancy without a valid CO is a separate violation. The facility has generated approximately 7,507 such violations since September 2005. A use that was never fully certified as lawful (no final CO), that has been in continuous daily violation of the building code for twenty years, and that now operates under materially different conditions than those represented to the Planning and Zoning Commission in 2003 cannot claim the protection of the original land use permit. It is not a nonconforming use entitled to continuation; it is an unauthorized use that requires a new application, a new public hearing, new findings of compatibility, and full compliance with all applicable building and fire codes before it may resume.

The regulatory record does not support any interpretation under which continued operation is permissible. Immediate closure is not a policy preference; it is a legal necessity.



Section 2. The Special Use Permit Cannot Be Resurrected

The City's February 2026 response to the Certificate of Occupancy gap was to arrange a quiet retroactive inspection and issue a cure list. That response addresses a building code instrument. It does not address the land use instrument that authorized the use in the first place. The Special Use Permit approved in 2003 is not merely dormant. Under four independent and separately sufficient legal grounds, it cannot be resurrected to authorize the current use at its current scale. Any of these grounds would be sufficient. All four apply simultaneously.

The connection between land use permit and building code is not abstract. The City's own building permit file makes it concrete. The Building Permit Conditions List for Permit No. 04-5054 classifies the Occupancy as "B/I-3": Group B for the office component, Group I-3 for the detention component. This classification was the bridge between the SUP (which authorized the use) and the building code (which governed the physical safety requirements for that use). The I-3 classification triggered more than twenty pages of mandatory conditions, including eighteen Group I Occupancy provisions (IO-1 through IO-18), twenty-two fire department requirements (F-1 through F-22), and fifty existing requirements (X-1 through X-50). These conditions were the operational translation of what the SUP authorized into what the building had to be. The City wrote them. The contractor acknowledged them in writing on June 2, 2004. And then no one verified whether any of them were met, for twenty-one years. A Special Use Permit that authorized a detention use is only as valid as the building code compliance that was supposed to make that use safe. When the compliance framework collapses, the authorization collapses with it.

2.1 Lapse by Operation of Law

A Special Use Permit authorizes a specific use at a specific location subject to all applicable codes. The Certificate of Occupancy is not a formality collateral to the Special Use Permit. It is the operational mechanism by which the use that the SUP authorized is certified as lawful. These two instruments work in tandem: the SUP establishes the land use authorization; the CO establishes that the physical space is safe for the authorized use. Both must be valid simultaneously. Neither substitutes for the other. The SUP approved in 2003 did not and could not authorize twenty years of occupancy without inspection, without a valid Certificate of Occupancy, and with non-functioning life-safety systems.

The Temporary Certificate of Occupancy for Suites 110 and 210 expired September 1, 2005. From that date forward, there was no valid operational certification for the detention use. The Special Use Permit did not independently authorize continued occupancy in the absence of a valid Certificate of Occupancy. It authorized a use that was required to comply with all applicable codes at all times, and that use has been out of code compliance, continuously, for approximately twenty years.

The Glenwood Springs Municipal Code forecloses the argument that the 2003 SUP can be resurrected to authorize the current use. Three independent code provisions apply:

- **GSMC Section 070.030.030** provides that noncompliance with applicable laws "shall be justification for revocation of any permits issued by the City." The word "shall" is mandatory, not discretionary. The detention use has been in continuous noncompliance with GSMC Section 060.010 (the CO requirement) since September 1, 2005. That twenty-year period of documented noncompliance is not a technicality. It is the specific condition the code identifies as grounds for mandatory permit revocation.
- **GSMC Section 060.010** prohibits occupancy of any commercial space without a valid Certificate of Occupancy. GSMC provides that each day of occupancy without a valid CO is a separate violation. The detention use has generated approximately 7,507 separate violations since the TCO expired. A use that has been in continuous daily violation of the building code for twenty years cannot claim the protection of a land use permit that was conditioned on compliance with that same code.
- **GSMC Section 070.010.080**, the enforcement provision City Attorney Karl Hanlon himself cited at the March 19, 2026 Council meeting, authorizes enforcement actions for violations of the Development Code, including violations of special use permit conditions. Under this section, the City may issue a notice of violation and schedule a hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission. The same provision authorizes the full range of remedies, including revocation.

2.1.1 No Grandfathering, No Vested Right, No Nonconforming Use Protection

A Special Use Permit is not a vested property right. It is a conditional authorization that depends entirely on continued compliance with the conditions of approval and all applicable codes. The detention use at 100 Midland Avenue cannot be grandfathered under any legal theory available in Colorado municipal law.

Nonconforming use protections under Colorado zoning law apply to uses that were lawfully established and maintained under a prior regulatory regime and were rendered nonconforming by a subsequent change in the zoning code. The detention use at 100 Midland Avenue does not qualify for this protection for three reasons: (a) the use was never lawfully completed because no final Certificate of Occupancy was ever issued, meaning the use was never fully authorized under the regulatory regime that existed at the time; (b) the use has not been maintained in compliance with the conditions of approval or with applicable building and fire codes at any point since September 2005; and (c) the 2018 Unified Development Code update did not change the zoning classification for the property or eliminate detention as a permissible special use, so there is no subsequent regulatory change to trigger nonconforming use protection.

The 2003 SUP authorized a use. The City's building and fire codes required that it be certified safe before occupancy could begin and to be re-verified annually through mandatory fire inspections. Neither condition was met. The use has operated for two decades outside the legal framework that was supposed to govern it. Under standard Colorado municipal zoning practice, a use that has operated in continuous noncompliance with the conditions of its approval for this duration is not a lawful nonconforming use. It is an unauthorized use that requires a new application, a new public hearing, and new findings of compatibility before it may resume.

Under standard Colorado municipal zoning practice and the Glenwood Springs Unified Development Code (UDC), a Special Use Permit may be deemed abandoned or lapsed when the authorized use ceases to comply with the conditions of approval or with applicable codes for an extended period. The City cannot now point to a 2003 Special Use Permit as validating a 2026 detention operation that has been out of code compliance since 2005.

2.2 The Changed Conditions Bar

A Special Use Permit is a determination of compatibility with surrounding land uses, infrastructure capacity, traffic conditions, and public safety under the conditions that exist at the time of approval. It is not a permanent authorization. It is a snapshot determination that freezes compatibility as of a specific moment. Every material element of the 2003 compatibility finding has changed. The planning materials paint the picture of "grasslands" surrounded on all sides by rail, storage, and agricultural uses.

Changed Condition	Legal Significance
Glenwood Meadows Area Development Agreement approved 2002-2003; full build-out 2004-2015	The corridor transformed from a transitional zone into a high-density mixed commercial and residential district. The surrounding land uses against which the 2003 compatibility finding was made no longer exist.
Pedestrian bridge constructed over the Colorado River adjacent to the facility's sally port	The bridge created a new active transportation corridor immediately adjacent to the facility's secure entrance. HSI's own September 2025 SPEAR intelligence email treats this as a security concern. The 2003 SUP was issued before the bridge existed.
RFTA transit corridor growth; substantially increased pedestrian and cyclist density	The 2003 compatibility finding could not have accounted for the level of public activity now present in the immediate vicinity of a federal detention sally port.
\$13.2 million 8th Street reconstruction; planned roundabout at Midland/Grand	Material changes to traffic patterns and corridor infrastructure that postdate the 2003 finding.
Operational hold limit extended from 12 hours to 72 hours by ICE Nationwide Hold Room Waiver memorandum, June 24, 2025	The original SUP application explicitly represented holds of "no more than 12 hours" in GSA's May 7, 2003 letter to the City Planner. The 12-hour limit was an ICE policy from at least 2011 through June

	2025 (PBNDS Section 2.6; NDS 2025). On June 24, 2025, ICE issued a nationwide waiver extending the limit to 72 hours. The current use operates at six times the duration represented to the City at the time of approval. The Planning and Zoning Commission relied on the 12-hour representation in evaluating compatibility,
TRIDENT replaced by SPEAR; dedicated Intelligence Analyst position created; active surveillance of community members	The 2003 application disclosed that the space would be shared with TRIDENT. TRIDENT has since been replaced by the SPEAR Task Force, which now maintains a dedicated Intelligence Analyst (Laura Horsey) who, in September 2025, distributed surveillance imagery and a minute-by-minute movement log of a community member on a rented e-bike to forty-seven named law enforcement recipients for asking whether the building housed ICE or ATF. The intelligence and surveillance footprint of the facility's co-tenant was not part of the 2003 compatibility finding.
Incident volume at 100 Midland Avenue nearly tripled in consecutive years	GSPD crime data produced in November 2024 for a Federal Protective Service Facility Security Assessment shows 54 incidents at 100 Midland Avenue between November 4, 2022 and November 3, 2023, and 156 incidents between November 4, 2023 and November 3, 2024. The nearly threefold increase in law enforcement incidents at the address is itself evidence of changed conditions that the 2003 compatibility determination could not have anticipated.
Glenwood Springs Comprehensive Plan updated post-2003	The City's current comprehensive plan governs current land use decisions. A 2003 SUP cannot be deemed consistent with a comprehensive plan that did not exist when it was issued.

Under UDC Title 070 and Colorado zoning law generally, the City has not only the authority but the obligation to conduct a changed-conditions review when the factual predicate for a Special Use Permit has changed materially. The question is not whether change has occurred. It has, in every material category. The question is whether the City will acknowledge its obligation to conduct that review.

2.3 Comprehensive Plan Consistency

Colorado zoning law requires that Special Use Permits be consistent with the municipality's adopted comprehensive plan. This is not merely a procedural requirement at the moment of issuance. A use that was consistent with a comprehensive plan adopted in 2003 may not be consistent with a comprehensive plan adopted or amended thereafter.

The retroactive Certificate of Occupancy the City attempted to arrange in February 2026 is a building code instrument. It says nothing about whether the use is consistent with the City's current planning framework, whether the corridor can accommodate the use at its current scale, or whether the public safety, traffic, and compatibility impacts of the current operation are consistent with what the comprehensive plan envisions for this corridor.

2.4 The Procedural Bar

Even if all three substantive bars could be cleared, the procedural requirements for validating a Special Use Permit are mandatory and cannot be waived by administrative convenience. A new or amended Special Use Permit requires: (1) application by the property owner or tenant with full disclosure; (2) notice to all adjacent and affected property owners; (3) a public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission; (4) an opportunity for public comment on the record; (5) written findings that the proposed use is compatible with surrounding uses and consistent with the comprehensive plan; and (6) approval by the P&Z Commission. All six steps are mandatory. None occurred in February 2026.

What the City did in February 2026 was schedule an inspection, issue a cure list, and copy the City Attorney on the correspondence. That is not a Special Use Permit review. A Special Use Permit review is a public, adversarial, evidence-based proceeding in which the community has the right to be heard. After twenty years of unauthorized operation, the current use is under materially changed conditions, at a materially different operational scale, in a corridor that no longer resembles the one evaluated in 2003.



Section 3. The Documented Record at a Glance

Table 3-1. Documented Record Summary

Every fact below is drawn from primary sources: the City's own records, its February 25, 2026 post-inspection letter, CORA-produced email correspondence, federal FOIA data, the City's own Compliance Engine enforcement documents, the City's building permit file, and documents obtained from the facility's own files.

ISSUE	WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS	PRIMARY SOURCE	QUESTION RAISED
Temporary Certificate of Occupancy	Issued December 14, 2004; extended to September 1, 2005. Expired by its own terms.	City Building Dept. Records (CORA); Post Independent, Mar. 6, 2026	The TCO expired 21 years ago. What legal authority permitted continued operation after September 1, 2005?
Final Certificate of Occupancy	The city states it cannot locate one: “We are unable to determine that a full certificate of occupancy was issued.”	City Post-Inspection Letter, Feb. 25, 2026	The City has admitted in writing that no final CO exists. What enforcement action is the City taking?
Building Permit Conditions	More than twenty pages of mandatory conditions, including fire department requirements (F-1 through F-22), Group I Occupancy provisions (IO-1 through IO-18), existing requirements (X-1 through X-50), and accessibility standards. Contractor signed acknowledgment June 2, 2004. Two handwritten notations (May 10 and May 17, 2004) required “Exterior Lighting Details Prior to Final Inspection.”	City Building Permit File, Permit No. 04-0113 (CORA, Physical File Set)	Were these conditions ever verified as met? The February 2026 inspection found the lighting system flagged in 2004 as non-functioning.
Fire Safety Inspections, 2004-2025	Zero documented. No annual inspection report exists for any year of the facility’s operating history.	CORA Production, City Bldg. Dept.; Aspen Journalism, Mar. 17, 2026	Twenty-one years without a single fire inspection for a facility housing restrained occupants. Why did enforcement fail entirely?
Orders to Comply, March-May 2025	Parachute Fire Protection inspected on March 5, 2025: four Impairment-level deficiencies. First Order to Comply (NID 9290456) issued ~March 14, 2025. Second Order to Comply (NID 9683590) issued May 12, 2025. No proof of correction received on either.	NID 9290456 (primary); NID 9683590 (primary, signed by Fire Marshal Pitt)	The City’s own Fire Marshal issued two enforcement orders and received no compliance. Why was enforcement abandoned?
Emergency Exit Lighting	Non-functioning. Documented in the City’s own post-inspection letter. The building permit file contains two separate handwritten notations (May 2004) requiring exterior lighting details “prior to final inspection.”	City Post-Inspection Letter, Feb. 25, 2026; Permit File handwritten notes, May 10 and 17, 2004	The lighting condition flagged in 2004 was never resolved. Was detention suspended after this finding? If not, why not?
Fire Sprinkler System	Untested for approximately 20 years. Sprinkler heads exceed the 20-year manufacturer service life.	City Post-Inspection Letter, Feb. 25, 2026; NID 9290456; NID 9683590	Has the City required immediate testing, or ordered the facility vacated pending testing?
Emergency Evacuation Plan	An evacuation plan was an explicit condition of the SUP. On November 20, 2003, Fire Chief Piper, Fire Protection Analyst Biggers, and B.I.C.E. agents met at City Hall to develop it. Specific protocols were	Biggers letter, May 13, 2004; Peterson memo, May 5, 2004; Sundesigns meeting notes, Nov. 20, 2003 and May 4, 2004; GSA poster (OneDrive); City letter, Feb. 25, 2026	Where is the evacuation plan? Were the Knox-box keys maintained? Were the systems the plan relied on ever rechecked?

	<p>established: alarm system, sprinkler system, door hardware, Knox-box access with keys to the holding room. On May 13, 2004, Biggers approved the plan in writing. Twenty-one years later, the plan has vanished. The only emergency document on record is a generic GSA poster (“Run, Hide, Fight”). The City’s Feb. 2026 letter asked the tenant to “prepare/provide” evacuation procedures, as if none had ever been required</p>		
IBC Occupant Classification	<p>Group I-3 (Institutional, Restrained). Highest life-safety classification. Triggered by restraint alone. The building permit file confirms the dual classification B/I-3 across multiple documents: the permit itself, the TCO, and the conditions list.</p>	<p>IBC (2021) Section 308.5; Permit No. 04-0113; TCO dated 12/14/2004</p>	<p>Was this building ever permitted, reviewed, or inspected for Group I-3 occupancy?</p>
Original SUP Representations	<p>GSA’s May 7, 2003 application represented holds of “no more than 12 hours,” a maximum of approximately 60 persons (5 employees, ~55 detainees), and co-occupancy with TRIDENT. Current operations: up to 72-hour holds, TRIDENT replaced by SPEAR with dedicated intelligence analyst.</p>	<p>Russell Fury letter to Jill Peterson, May 7, 2003 (Physical File Set)</p>	<p>Has the City ever verified whether the operational parameters represented at the time of SUP approval are still being observed?</p>
Building Status, Mid-2025	<p>Yellow-tagged by City inspectors. Detention use continued after the yellow tag was posted.</p>	<p>City Building Dept. Records (CORA); Aspen Journalism</p>	<p>Who authorized continued detention use after the yellow tag, and was Council informed?</p>
Medical Emergency	<p>EMS responded to Suite 210 on February 26, 2026, one day after the City’s inspection documented non-functioning life-safety systems.</p>	<p>EMS call records, Feb. 26, 2026 (CORA from Glenwood Springs Fire)</p>	<p>Did the City consider whether the documented deficiencies affected the response?</p>
Hold Room Operations, 2025	<p>Federal data obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the Deportation Data Project and analyzed by the Colorado Times Recorder identifies the Glenwood Springs facility by its internal ICE identifier “GSCHOLD” and documents 73 detainees held there between January and October 2025. Of those detainees, 45% had no criminal record. The data confirms the facility was actively operating as a hold room throughout 2025, during the same period the City’s fire department had issued and then</p>	<p>Colorado Times Recorder, March 19, 2026 (citing Deportation Data Project FOIA data); ICE Nationwide Hold Room Waiver memorandum, June 24, 2025 (Immigration Policy Tracking Project, Policy ID 1970; original document filed in D.N.N. v. Baker, No. 1:25-cv-01613, D. Md.)</p>	<p>Were any of the 73 people detained at this facility between January and October 2025 informed that the fire suppression system had been classified as impaired by the City’s own Fire Marshal?</p>

	abandoned two Orders to Comply.		
SPEAR Intelligence Function	Laura Horsey, formally titled “SPEAR-Intelligence Analyst,” distributed surveillance imagery and a minute-by-minute movement log of a community member on a rented e-bike to forty-seven named law enforcement recipients across GCSO and GSPD on September 24, 2025. The subject’s activity: riding an e-bike over the pedestrian bridge, stopping briefly, and asking a cleaning person whether the building housed ICE or ATF. HSI Special Agent Christopher Carter provided the surveillance description and imagery from facility cameras.	CORA email: Horsey to GCSO/GSPD distribution, Sept. 24, 2025; Carter forwarded email, Sept. 24, 2025	Is asking about the occupancy of a building on a public street a law enforcement matter? What is the legal basis for distributing surveillance imagery of a community member to forty-seven officers?
Protest Monitoring	On June 10, 2025, HSI Special Agent Sarah Vasquez emailed GSPD Officer Michael Prough with the subject line “Protest at Glenwood Springs Office tomorrow,” forwarding a screenshot of MtnAction Indivisible’s Facebook post organizing a community protest at the Wulfson Park and Ride. Her cover note read: “Great chatting with you.” The email contained no threat assessment, no safety concern, and no reference to criminal activity. It was a federal agent sharing advanced intelligence about a constitutionally protected community demonstration with a local police officer.	CORA email: Vasquez to Prough, June 10, 2025	What is the nature of the ongoing coordination between HSI and GSPD regarding community protest activity? Does the City acknowledge that this relationship exists?
Incident Volume	GSPD crime data produced for a Federal Protective Service Facility Security Assessment shows 54 incidents at 100 Midland Avenue between November 4, 2022 and November 3, 2023, and 156 incidents between November 4, 2023 and November 3, 2024: a nearly threefold increase. Incident types include traffic stops, directed patrols, suspicious event reports, building checks, motor vehicle theft, and theft/larceny.	GSPD incident search data provided by Records Clerk Nicole Kimminau, Nov. 20, 2024; FPS/DHS Area Commander Michael Waters request, Nov. 19, 2024	Does the City consider a threefold increase in law enforcement incidents at the facility to address a changed condition relevant to the 2003 compatibility finding?
Absentee Ownership; Lost Construction Records	Building lessor Jeffrey W. Gillespie operates JG Housing Solutions LLC from Tampa Bay,	CORA email: Gillespie to Workman, Feb. 24, 2026, 1:01	With no contractor records and an absentee lessor, who has been responsible for maintaining code

	Florida (identified by email domain J5Gill@tampabay.rr.com and email signature). The original general contractor, Joe Mueller of Mueller Construction, closed his business in 2025 and has no records from the 2004-2005 buildout. Gillespie reported this based on contact through his general contractor, Frank McSwain, who spoke with Mueller directly.	PM; Workman to Hyatt, Feb. 24, 2026	compliance for the past twenty years?
Karl Hanlon: Conflicts	None disclosed. Served as City Attorney 2000-2005, encompassing every step of the facility's original authorization. His signature appears on SUP No. 4-04, dated May 17, 2004. Now characterizes that history as a clerical oversight. Copied on the February 24, 2026 scheduling email and the February 25, 2026 post-inspection letter. At the March 19, 2026 Council meeting, announced he would personally manage the enforcement process and instructed Council not to engage with public speakers. His firm, Karp Neu Hanlon, P.C., serves as general or special counsel to multiple municipalities in the region.	City Attorney contract records (CORA); City Council minutes, 2000-2005; Physical File Set, SUP approval page; March 19, 2026 City Council meeting	Has Mr. Hanlon disclosed to Council his role during the entire permitting period? Has he recused himself? Has independent outside counsel been retained?

Key source abbreviations: Post Independent = postindependent.com. Aspen Journalism = aspenjournalism.org. CO Times Recorder = coloradotimesrecorder.com. IBC Section 308.5 = International Building Code 2021, Chapter 3 (Group I-3 occupancy). GSMC = Glenwood Springs Municipal Code. CORA = Colorado Open Records Act production from City of Glenwood Springs. NID = Notification ID from the City's Brycer Compliance Engine platform



Section 4. What the Law Requires vs. What the City Proposed

4.1 What Is a Group I-3 Occupancy?

IBC Section 308.5 defines a Group I-3 occupancy as a building or portion in which more than five persons are under restraint or security and cannot freely self-evacuate in an emergency. The key phrase in the IBC is “incapable of self-preservation due to security measures not under the occupants’ control.” The classification is triggered by one fact: the occupants are restrained. Duration does not matter. The operator’s identity does not matter.

The City’s February 25, 2026 post-inspection letter acknowledged the occupancy classification: “a temporary certificate of occupancy for a detention center use, occupancy group type B/I-3.” The dual designation B/I-3 is significant. Group B is for general office use. Group I-3 is for restrained-occupancy detention. Where the standards conflict, stricter applies. The City’s proposed remedies reflect Group B thinking applied to an I-3 reality.

4.1.1 The Five Condition Levels

I-3 occupancies are subdivided into Conditions 1 through 5, based on the degree to which occupants' movement is restricted. Each successive condition assumes less ability to self-evacuate and requires more stringent life-safety features.

- **Condition 1** permits free movement to the exterior (minimum-security work release).
- **Condition 2** permits free movement within smoke compartments but locks exits to the exterior.
- **Condition 3** permits free movement within individual smoke compartments but impedes movement between compartments via remote-controlled release.
- **Condition 4** restricts free movement from the occupied space. Remote-controlled release permits movement to other smoke compartments.
- **Condition 5** restricts free movement from the occupied space. Staff-controlled manual release is required, and the facility must be equipped throughout with an approved automatic sprinkler system and automatic smoke detection.

4.1.2 The 100 Midland Facility Is Condition 4 or 5.

The GSA's 2003 application stated that detainees would not be present without staff and would be held in a locked holding room. The B.I.C.E. representatives confirmed this at the November 20, 2003 evacuation planning meeting. Detainees arrive in full mechanical restraints and are placed in a room with a door that cannot be opened from the inside. Movement is restricted from the occupied space. Release depends on either remote-controlled or staff-controlled manual mechanisms. This places the facility at minimum at Condition 4 and likely at Condition 5. At Condition 5, the IBC requires staff-controlled manual release, an approved automatic sprinkler system throughout, and an approved automatic smoke detection system throughout. Each of these systems has failed or cannot be verified at 100 Midland Avenue.

The City's own building permit file confirms that the I-3 classification was understood and specifically addressed at the time of construction. The building permit conditions list includes a dedicated Group I Occupancies section (items IO-1 through IO-18), prescribing requirements for fire-resistive occupancy separation, automatic sprinkler systems, exit requirements specific to restrained populations, fire alarm and smoke detection, and emergency power. The building permit conditions also document a "Type II-N" construction designation, which is permissible for I-3 occupancies only if all other I-3 systems are in place. These provisions are not general commercial requirements. They are detention-specific conditions that the City itself identified, required, and documented in 2004. The February 2026 post-inspection letter applies to none of them.

4.1.3 The Construction Type Problem.

The Building Permit Conditions List header page identifies the construction type as "Type II-N." Under the 1997 Uniform Building Code (the code in effect at the time of permit issuance), Type II-N means non-combustible construction with zero hours of fire-resistance rating for structural elements. This is the lowest possible fire-resistance rating. It is the construction type typically associated with low-hazard business and commercial occupancies, not detention facilities where occupants are physically restrained and cannot flee. Whether Type II-N construction provides adequate structural fire-resistance for a Group I-3 detention occupancy at the floor area identified in the permit (6,298 square feet) and number of stories (2) is a code compliance question that the building official was required to resolve before issuing a final Certificate of Occupancy. That resolution never occurred. The question of whether the building's structural fire-resistance is adequate for the use it houses has been open, unanswered, for twenty-one years. A Type II-N building provides zero structural fire resistance: in a fire, the structural elements provide no rated protection. If the automatic sprinkler system that compensates for that deficiency has not been tested in twenty years, and if the emergency lighting that would allow staff to locate and release restrained occupants is non-functioning, then the entire life-safety chain that was supposed to protect people who cannot protect themselves has failed at every link.

4.2 Requirements vs. Remedies: A Comparison

Table 4-1. Requirements vs. Remedies Comparison

COMPLIANT- The proposed remedy brings the space into compliance with applicable IBC, IFC, or NFPA standards for Group I-3 occupancy.

NONCOMPLIANT means the proposed remedy does not bring the space into compliance with the applicable IBC, IFC, or NFPA standard for Group I-3 occupancy.

UNVERIFIED means the City's letter did not address the requirement and no inspection or verification was performed.

IBC/IFC REQUIREMENT FOR GROUP I-3	CITY'S PROPOSED REMEDY (FEB. 25, 2026)	STATUS
<p>IBC Section 903.2.6 and 903.3.1.1: Automatic NFPA 13 sprinkler system required throughout. Annual inspection and testing required.</p>	<p>Item 5: "Fire sprinkler heads are in excess of 20 years. Certified technician shall provide passing UL test or replacement per NFPA standards." No mention of annual inspection</p>	<p>NONCOMPLIANT</p>

	records, five-year internal inspection, or 25-year obstruction cycle. No closure order.	
IBC Section 1008.3: Emergency lighting required in all occupied spaces and egress paths. Monthly 30-second test; annual 90-minute full test; records maintained.	Item 1: "Update/replace non-functioning exit and emergency lighting." No inspection of battery backup capacity. No 90-minute test requirement. No monthly test logs. No closure order. The building permit file contains two handwritten notations (May 2004) requiring "Exterior Lighting Details Prior to Final Inspection," confirming this was a known prerequisite that was never satisfied.	NONCOMPLIANT
IBC Section 408.6: Building must be divided into at least two smoke compartments. Each smoke compartment must allow evacuation of inmates within 6 minutes from the compartment of origin, 24 hours per day. Smoke barriers between compartments per Section 709.	Not addressed. No evidence in the building permit file, CORA production, or any City document that the building was ever divided into smoke compartments or that any 6-minute evacuation capacity analysis was performed.	UNVERIFIED
IBC Section 408.3 and 408.3.8: Egress doors must be unlockable towards the exit. For Condition 4: remote-controlled release required. For Condition 5: staff-controlled manual release required, with automatic sprinkler and smoke detection throughout. Sallyport egress must be possible with no more than one door locked at a time.	Not addressed. No inspection or verification of locking mechanism type, release mechanism integration with fire alarm, or sallyport egress sequencing.	UNVERIFIED
IBC Section 408.3.8: Locking mechanisms must be configured so no device prevents egress when fire alarm activates.	Not addressed in the City letter. No inspection or verification of locking mechanism integration with fire alarm	UNVERIFIED
IBC Section 907.2.6: Manual and automatic fire alarm system required throughout, including automatic smoke detection for staff alerting. Actuation of any sprinkler, pull station, or detector must initiate an alarm signal that automatically notifies staff.	Not addressed in the City letter. No inspection or verification of smoke detection coverage, alarm monitoring status, NFPA 72 compliance, or staff notification integration	UNVERIFIED
IBC Section 408.9: Windowless building provisions. For Conditions 3, 4, or 5 in windowless areas with occupant loads over 50, an engineered smoke control system per Section 909 is required in each windowless smoke compartment.	Not addressed. Suite 210 is an upper-floor interior space in a commercial building. No determination has been made whether the detention area qualifies as a windowless area requiring an engineered smoke control system.	UNVERIFIED
IBC Section 408.7: Security glazing in fire barriers, fire partitions, and smoke barriers must be protected on both sides by sprinklers designed to wet the entire glazing surface when actuated.	Not addressed. No inspection of whether security glazing exists in fire-rated assemblies and whether sprinkler protection is provided.	UNVERIFIED
IFC Section 404.2 and IBC Section 408.4: Written emergency evacuation plan required, specific to restrained occupants. Reviewed annually. Staff trained. Plan posted.	Item 4: "Prepare/provide a copy of emergency evacuation procedures for the temporary holding area." The replacement document lists the wrong address (120 Midland Ave), contains seven words of detention-specific guidance, and meets none of the IFC Section 404.2 requirements. No closure order.	NONCOMPLIANT

NFPA 70 Section 110.26: Minimum 36 inches of clear workspace required before electrical panels.	Item 2: “Maintain 36 inches of clearance around the electrical panel upstairs.” Does not note heightened I-3 risk.	PARTIAL COMPLIANCE
IBC Section 714 and IFC Section 703: All penetrations in fire-rated assemblies must be sealed with listed fire-stopping materials.	Item 3: “Patch holes in garage ceiling located above heater unit.” Does not specify required fire-resistance rating or listed fire-stop materials.	NONCOMPLIANT
IBC Section 1108.5.5: At least 3% of sleeping/holding units must be accessible, with at least one accessible holding cell for each purpose (orientation, protective custody, administrative detention, medical isolation).	Not addressed. No verification of accessible holding cell provisions.	UNVERIFIED
Group I-3 fire-resistance rated corridor walls: Corridors in I-3 occupancies require fire-resistance ratings regardless of sprinkler status, unlike Group B occupancies where sprinklering can reduce corridor ratings to zero.	Not addressed. No verification of corridor fire-resistance ratings in the detention portion of the building.	UNVERIFIED
IBC Section 111.1 and GSMC Section 060.010: No person shall occupy a building until the building official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy.	City approach: retroactive inspection and cure list rather than closure order. Occupancy allowed to continue during the cure period.	NONCOMPLIANT
IFC Section 104.1: Fire code officials shall enter and examine any structure at reasonable times. I-3 occupancies require annual documented fire code inspections.	Zero annual inspections documented for any year between 2004 and 2025. The February 25, 2026 inspection was the first in twenty-one years.	NONCOMPLIANT

4.3 What the Comparison Shows

Of the fifteen material I-3 requirements examined in Table 4-1, none are addressed to the standard required for a Group I-3 occupancy. Five are Noncompliant (the City’s proposed remedy does not achieve compliance). Eight are Unverified (the City’s inspection did not address the requirement at all). One is Partial Compliance. The CO requirement and the ongoing annual inspection obligation are both Noncompliant.

The pattern is consistent: the City applied Group B office standards to a Group I-3 detention space across every category. The City issued and classified a B/I-3 occupancy permit, then enforced it as a B occupancy for twenty-two years. A repair list is appropriate when a Group B office has a malfunctioning exit sign. It is not appropriate when a Group I-3 detention space has non-functioning emergency lighting, a twenty-year-old untested sprinkler system, no evacuation plan, no verified smoke compartments, no verified alarm-to-egress integration, no determination of whether the detention area is a windowless space requiring engineered smoke control, and no valid CO. The legally required response under IBC Section 116.1 is a closure order.

The building permit file makes this pattern more troubling, not less. The City’s own 2004 conditions list identifies every one of the Group I Occupancy requirements that the February 2026 inspection failed to verify. The City knew in 2004 exactly what standards applied. It wrote them into the conditions list. It required the contractor to sign off on them. And then it failed to verify compliance for twenty-one years.

4.3.1 The “Standard Maintenance” Characterization

Of the five items identified in the February 25, 2026 inspection, three involve conditions that can reasonably be categorized as building upkeep: maintaining clearance around an electrical panel, patching holes in a garage ceiling, and replacing nonfunctioning exit and emergency lighting.

The remaining two items are different in kind.

The fire sprinkler heads identified as exceeding twenty years without UL testing or NFPA-compliant replacement are the same sprinkler heads that were present when the TCO was issued on December 14, 2004. They were part of the pre-existing commercial infrastructure, not new equipment installed during the federal tenant buildout. NFPA standards require periodic testing and replacement of sprinkler heads at specified intervals. No record in the CORA production or the building permit file indicates that this testing was ever performed.

The fourth item on the City’s list is the absence of emergency evacuation procedures for the temporary holding area in the event of a fire alarm. This is not a maintenance condition. It is the absence of a written safety protocol for a space where individuals are held

involuntarily and cannot self-evacuate. The building permit file confirms that the original occupancy classification for Suites 110 and 210 was Group B/I-3, a detention use category. Evacuation procedures are a baseline operational requirement for that classification.

The City's February 25 email describes all five items collectively as "standard maintenance."

4.4 The Evacuation Plan: Required, Approved, and Abandoned

IFC Section 404.2 and IBC Section 408.4 require a written emergency evacuation plan specific to restrained occupants. This is not a suggestion. It is a mandatory precondition for Group I-3 occupancy. The plan must address how restrained individuals who cannot self-evacuate will be removed from the structure in an emergency. It must be reviewed annually, staff must be trained on it, and it must be posted.

The City knew this from the beginning. The evacuation plan was an explicit condition of the Special Use Permit. The record establishes the following sequence:

- **November 20, 2003:** A meeting was held at Glenwood Springs City Hanlon specifically to discuss the emergency evacuation protocol as a condition of the SUP. Present were Joe Quigg, Agent Investigator; Ben Baca, Medical Evacuation Officer (ORT); Fire Chief Michael Piper; Fire Protection Analyst Ronald Biggers; and Dean Moffatt and Randy Henrie of Sundesigns Architects. B.I.C.E. representatives explained their operation and evacuation procedures. The group reviewed the alarm system, the sprinkler system, door hardware, 911 procedures, and transport to hospital. B.I.C.E. stressed that detainees would not be present without staff. It was agreed that a Knox-box would be used for fire and emergency purposes, with keys to the facility and all interior rooms, including the holding room, placed inside.
- **May 5, 2004:** City Planner Jill Peterson sent a memorandum to Fire Protection Analyst Ron Biggers asking whether his department had "signed off on the evacuation plan." She noted that the evacuation plan was a condition of the SUP and asked for written confirmation "so that I have a paper trail in the planning file."
- **May 13, 2004:** Biggers responded on Glenwood Springs Fire Department letterhead, confirming that "the B.I.C.E. representatives have met with Chief Piper and myself to review their evacuation plan for their new facility at the Midland Center in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. We are [sic] have approved their evacuation plan for this facility."

The plan existed. The Fire Chief reviewed it. It was approved in writing. The City Planner created a paper trail confirming it. And then it disappeared.

For the next twenty-one years, the City never verified that the evacuation plan still existed, was current, or had been reviewed annually as required. It never confirmed that the Knox-box keys were up to date. It never checked whether the alarm system, the sprinkler system, and the door hardware that the plan relied upon were still functioning. When the City finally inspected in February 2026, every one of those systems had failed: the sprinkler system had not been tested in approximately twenty years, the emergency lighting was non-functioning, and no evacuation plan could be located.

4.5 The "Know the Plan of Action" Poster

The only emergency procedures on record for 100 Midland Avenue is a generic GSA "Know the Plan of Action" poster addressed to "120 Midland Ave." The poster covers three scenarios: bomb threats, active shooters, and civil disturbances. It does not address fire or the evacuation of restrained or non-ambulatory occupants.

The active shooter section instructs occupants to "Run, Hide, Fight." The people detained at 100 Midland Avenue are in full mechanical restraints: wrist restraints, a waist chain, and leg irons. They are locked behind a door they cannot open from the inside. They cannot run, hide, or fight. The poster's instructions are physically impossible for the population it purports to protect.

The poster lists a California telephone number (562 area code) as the contact for the "official in charge." It is a standardized federal building template, not prepared for this facility, this occupancy classification, or these occupants.

4.6 The Missing Evacuation Plan

The City's post-inspection letter asked the tenant to "prepare/provide a copy of emergency evacuation procedures for the temporary holding area in the event of a fire alarm." That phrasing treats the evacuation plan as something that may need to be created from scratch. Yet the City's own 2003-2004 records show that a plan was created, reviewed by the Fire Chief, and approved in writing. The City required a paper trail, built one, and then lost or abandoned both the plan and the obligation to maintain it.

4.6.1 The SUP Condition Was Never Formally Satisfied

The SUP condition required submission of an evacuation plan, not merely a discussion of one. The building permit file does not contain an actual plan. It contains a letter from Fire Protection Analyst Biggers confirming that B.I.C.E. representatives met with the Fire Chief and "discussed" their evacuation procedures. A letter confirming a conversation is not the plan itself. If the condition required submission of a written plan, and the file contains only a letter confirming a conversation about procedures, the condition may never have been formally satisfied. The City Planner's May 5, 2004 memo, requesting written confirmation "so that I have a paper trail in the planning file," suggests awareness even at the time that the documentary record was incomplete.

4.6.2 Collapse of the Safety Framework

The November 2003 meeting established a coordinated system: an evacuation plan developed with the Fire Department, a Knox-box with keys to every room including the holding room, an alarm system, a sprinkler system, and door hardware reviewed for emergency egress. Every element of that system has failed or cannot be verified. The City's response was to ask the tenant to write a new plan, with no deadline, no closure order, and no requirement that occupancy cease until one was in place.

4.7 The Replacement Plan: Wrong Address, Wrong Standard

At the March 19, 2026 City Council meeting, City Manager Boyd stated that an evacuation plan had been "since provided" in response to the February 25, 2026 inspection finding. The document provided is a one-page GSA "Occupant Emergency Plan" template. It fails as a Group I-3 evacuation plan on every material standard.

1. **Wrong address.** The document lists the building as 120 Midland Avenue. The detention facility is at 100 Midland Avenue, Suites 110 and 210.
2. **Wrong personnel.** The Designated Official is HSI Special Agent Sarah Vasquez, with an office phone in the 562 area code (Long Beach, California). The GSA Property Manager is Jarred Workman, the same GSA lease management specialist who coordinated the February 2026 inspection. The lessor is identified as J G Housing Solutions, with a mailing address in Parrish, Florida (Manatee County), consistent with the email domain J5Gill@tampabay.rr.com identified in the CORA production.
3. **Seven words of detention-specific guidance.** The fire evacuation section, the only portion addressing detained persons, reads in its entirety: "EVACUATE the area. If detainees are present in holding cells, securely move them to vehicles." That is the complete fire protocol for a Group I-3 facility where individuals are held in full mechanical restraints behind doors they cannot open from the inside.
4. **The plan omits every element required by IBC Section 408.4 and IFC Section 404.2,** including: staff-to-detainee ratios for emergency evacuation; procedures for moving individuals in wrist restraints, waist chains, and leg irons; smoke compartment and fire-resistance zone procedures; provisions for non-ambulatory or injured detainees; coordination protocols with the Glenwood Springs Fire Department; Knox-box key verification; alarm-to-egress locking mechanism integration under IBC Section 408.3.8; annual review requirements; and staff training documentation.

The GSA template addresses none of these elements. It is a standardized federal building form designed for conventional office occupancies where all occupants can exit under their own power.

The City's acceptance of this document as satisfying the February 25 inspection deficiency confirms the pattern identified throughout this analysis: the City applies Group B office standards to a Group I-3 detention space. A one-page template bearing the wrong address and seven words of detention-specific guidance is not an evacuation plan. It is evidence that neither the federal tenant nor the City understands, or is willing to apply, the standard that the building's actual occupancy classification requires.



Section 5. Response to the City's Public Statements

5.1 "A Clerical or Administrative Oversight"

"Everything in the record indicates this was a clerical or administrative oversight."

— City Attorney Karl Hanlon

"City staff generalizes these items as standard maintenance and has no reason to believe they existed at the time a TCO was provided."

— Director Trent Hyatt, Post-Inspection Letter, Feb. 25, 2026

5.1.1 The Facts on Record

A clerical oversight is a missing signature on an otherwise-complete file. The building permit file for Permit No. 04-0113 is not that. It is a file that stops in the middle of a regulatory process and never resumes. The file contains more than twenty pages of conditions to be verified before a final CO could issue, two handwritten notations requiring exterior lighting details "prior to final inspection," a fax confirming \$9,885 in outstanding tap fees, and the TCO itself with its expiration date. It does not contain any record that the final inspection occurred, that conditions were verified, or that anyone followed up when the TCO expired.

Beyond the file, the complete absence of compliance documentation across twenty-one years refutes the characterization. No final CO. No annual inspections. No emergency lighting test logs. No sprinkler inspection records. No documented contact with the tenant about compliance for any year between 2004 and 2025. Director Hyatt's use of "inadvertently" frames the missing CO as an accident of paperwork rather than a twenty-one-year failure of mandatory regulatory oversight. The legal consequences of each are materially different.

5.1.2 The Orders to Comply

On March 5, 2025, Parachute Fire Protection inspected the sprinkler system and identified four deficiencies, all classified as "Impairment" (the highest severity category):

- (a) Five-year internal inspection overdue; gauges expired.

(b) Sprinkler heads over 20 years old, requiring replacement.

(c) Cold soldering in Suite 240: sprinkler heads too close together, causing one head's thermal link to cool the adjacent head and prevent discharge.

(d) Gas cans and a gas-operated snow blower stored within 36 inches of the fire suppression water cut-off, in a building where restrained persons cannot self-evacuate.

The Fire Department issued the first Order to Comply (NID 9290456) on approximately March 14, 2025. No proof of correction was received. On May 12, 2025, Fire Marshal Robin Pitt signed a Second Notice/Order to Comply (NID 9683590). Both remained unenforced when Hanlon characterized the matter as a "clerical oversight" in February and March 2026.

5.1.3 The 2016 Contractor Inspection

A July 25, 2016 NFPA 25 Deficiency Report by SimplexGrinnell (now Johnson Controls) specifically identified deficiencies inside the DHS holding facility: missing ceiling tiles near sprinklers and smoke detectors creating heat sinks that would prevent sprinkler activation. The contractor classified these as requiring correction "ASAP per NFPA 25." The fire riser gauge dated to 2004 and required replacement. Three backflow prevention devices had failed. A follow-up Deficiency/Impairment Notice was issued August 15, 2016. These findings were in the City's records and were never corrected.

5.1.4 The Downgrading of Findings

The identical condition (sprinkler heads over 20 years old) was classified as an "Impairment" by Fire Marshal Pitt in March 2025 and downgraded to "standard maintenance" by Director Hyatt in February 2026. The Fire Marshal's classification carries professional authority under the International Fire Code. The Director of Community Development does not hold fire code certification authority. The City downgraded its own Fire Marshal's findings when presenting the matter to the public.

5.1.5 What the File Shows Hanlon Signed Over

Karl Hanlon served as City Attorney from 2000 to 2005. His signature appears on the SUP, dated May 17, 2004, certifying it "as to Form." That certification attests that the instrument is legally sufficient and that conditions precedent to its execution have been satisfied. The City's own records show the following conditions were unresolved at the time he signed:

- **No written evacuation plan.** City Planner Peterson's May 5, 2004 memo confirmed the plan was still outstanding. Fire Analyst Biggers' May 13 response confirmed only that a discussion had occurred. No written plan was attached, and none has surfaced in any City record. Peterson's stated prerequisite to SUP issuance was supported by a letter confirming a conversation, not a document satisfying the condition.
- **Exterior lighting unmet.** The building official's handwritten notation dated May 10, 2004, seven days before Hanlon signed, reads "Exterior Lighting Details Required Prior to Final Inspection." Twenty-one years later, the City's February 2026 inspection found exit and emergency lighting non-functioning.
- **The contractor had not acknowledged conditions.** The contractor signed the conditions acknowledgment on June 2, 2004, sixteen days after Hanlon certified the SUP.
- **Group I Occupancy provisions unverified.** Conditions IO-1 through IO-18 (detention-specific requirements including fire alarm, smoke detectors, sprinkler system, and emergency power) were never verified. IO-5 requires Type I or II-F.R. construction; the permit header classifies the building as Type II-N (zero hours fire-resistance). Whether the construction type satisfies Group I requirements has been an open question since 2004.

Hanlon has disclosed none of this to the Council or to the public. He has structured the April 28, 2026 hearing to exclude these facts. The person administering the procedures is the person whose prior conduct is documented in the file.

5.2 "The City Has No Evidence the Building Is Unsafe"

"The City currently has no evidence the building is unsafe for occupancy."

— City of Glenwood Springs, March 5, 2026

5.2.1 The City's Own Records Contain That Evidence

The May 12, 2025 Order to Comply (NID 9683590), signed by the City's Fire Marshal and classifying every deficiency as an "Impairment," was in the City's Brycer Compliance Engine when City Manager Boyd made this statement. The 2016 SimplexGrinnell report documenting detention-space fire protection deficiencies was also in the City's files. The City made its "no evidence" statement while sitting on two unenforced Orders to Comply and a contractor report, all in its own records.

Director Hyatt's assertion that it was "highly unlikely" 2004 staff would have allowed unsafe occupancy addresses what he assumes the City believed then. It says nothing about the twenty-one years that followed. The City has not released the full February 25, 2026 inspection report, the inspector's field notes, photographs, or the fire marshal's written assessment. The City is asking the public to accept its characterization of conditions it has not shown the public.

5.2.2 Restraint and Fire

The Group 1-3 classification exists because a person who cannot move freely cannot escape a fire. The people detained at 100 Midland Avenue arrive in full mechanical restraints: wrist restraints, a waist chain, and leg irons. They are held behind a door they cannot open from the inside. If a fire starts, they cannot leave, they cannot operate a fire extinguisher, and they cannot alert anyone outside. The fire suppression system protecting them had not been tested for approximately twenty years. The emergency lighting was non-functioning. No evacuation procedures existed for the hold area. The City issued a repair list calibrated to commercial office standards.

Glenwood Springs knows fire. The Coal Seam Fire of 2002 is part of this community's living memory. The failure to test fire suppression for twenty years in a space where occupants are physically restrained is not a maintenance issue. It is a documented life-safety crisis.

5.2.3 The Medical Emergency

The day after the City's inspection documented non-functioning life-safety systems, a medical emergency was witnessed and confirmed by the family at the facility. The Collective asks the City to explain what evidence would have been sufficient.

5.3 "Fair, Transparent, and Consistent"

"We are taking heat on this. . . . [W]e are hoping that we can have our Fire Marshall and Building Official inspect each of the applicable suites and issue certificates of occupancy in order to clear it up."

— Director Trent Hyatt, Email to HSI, Feb. 23, 2026

5.3.1 On Consistency

The Collective accepts "fairness, transparency, and consistency" as the standard. Hyatt's February 23 email describes an accommodation, not an enforcement action. The goal was to "clear it up," not hold the tenant accountable. The same email thread discussed the tenant's future interior remodel plans alongside the CO gap. GSA's February 26 response ("We'll regroup and make a plan to attack each of these items to get a C/O") treated the certificate as a logistical target, not a regulatory requirement. The Collective asks whether any other occupancy in Glenwood Springs has operated twenty-one years without a CO and without a fire inspection, and whether any other building with non-functioning emergency lighting and untested sprinklers received a repair list rather than a closure order.

5.3.2 The Seven-Day Timeline

February 18, 2026: HSI contacts the City. Hyatt responds within sixteen minutes, blind-copying the City Manager. Federal recipients could not see this. February 23: Hyatt follows up, noting the City is "taking heat." February 24: the building lessor reports the original contractor no longer exists and retained no records. February 25: city staff inspect Suites 110 and 210. By 6:19 PM, Hyatt issues a five-item cure list. Seven days from first contact to completed inspection. The CO had been missing for over twenty years.

5.3.3 Notice of Violation and April 28 Hearing

As of March 19, 2026, the City had not issued a notice of violation. No compliance deadline. No penalty. No stop-occupancy order. At the March 19 Council meeting, Hanlon announced a P&Z hearing for April 28 on "the sole question" of "whether or not the SUP was violated," limited to hold time. This framing excludes the CO gap (Title 060), the abandoned Orders to Comply (IFC), the non-functioning life-safety systems (IBC and NFPA), the 2016 contractor findings, the changed corridor conditions, and the surveillance coordination with the federal tenant. The attorney with a personal conflict in the underlying facts has structured the proceeding to exclude the facts most directly related to his own prior tenure.

5.3.4 The Disqualifying Conflict of Karl Hanlon

5.3.4.1 Personal Conflict. Hanlon served as City Attorney from 2000 to 2005 and signed the SUP. He cannot objectively evaluate the City's conduct during a period when that conduct was his own. Colorado RPC Rule 1.7(a)(2) prohibits representation where a lawyer's personal interest creates a significant risk of material limitation. Neither disclosure nor consent appears in the public record.

5.3.4.2 Firm Conflict. As a named partner at Karp Neu Hanlon, P.C., Hanlon's firm serves as general counsel for the City of Rifle, the Town of Collbran, the West Glenwood Sanitation District, and numerous other municipalities and special districts. A firm representing multiple municipalities has an institutional interest in how enforcement standards are defined. Under RPC Rule 1.10, individual conflicts are imputed to the firm.

5.3.4.3 Scope Manipulation.

At the March 19 meeting, Hanlon set the enforcement mechanism, timeline, hearing scope, and appellate pathway. He narrowed the hearing to hold time alone. He advised the Council to treat public communications as ex parte contacts. The advice is standard; the problem is that the advisor has a personal conflict in the underlying facts and is simultaneously defining which facts the proceeding will consider.

5.3.4.4 Multiple Independent Enforcement Bases

Hanlon has invoked only GSMC Section 070.010.080 (SUP conditions). The code provides additional independent bases he has excluded:

GSMC § 060.010: No occupancy without a valid CO. Each day is a separate violation.

GSMC § 070.030.030: Noncompliance “shall be justification for revocation of any permits.” Mandatory, not discretionary.

IBC §§ 111.1, 116.1: Cessation of occupancy for unauthorized spaces; closure of unsafe structures.

IFC §§ 104.1, 404.2: Annual fire inspections; mandatory written evacuation plans for Group I-3.

5.3.4.5 Grounds for Independent Counsel

The following grounds require the retention of independent outside counsel: (1) personal conflict under RPC Rule 1.7; (2) firm conflict under RPC Rule 1.10; (3) scope manipulation excluding all issues except hold time; (4) control of a quasi-judicial process in which Hanlon’s own prior conduct is a material fact; and (5) litigation positioning as defense counsel on a record that includes his own tenure. This Collective asks the City Council to retain independent counsel immediately, to evaluate all enforcement paths under Titles 060 and 070, the IBC, and the IFC, and to suspend Hanlon’s management of this matter.

5.4 What It Is Like Inside 100 Midland Avenue

There is no visible entrance for detainees. People are brought through a concealed interior entrance, away from public view, in full mechanical restraints: wrist restraints, a waist chain, and leg irons. These are not removed until the detainee is locked inside the cell. The hold room has concrete benches, a partially exposed toilet, no bed, and no natural light. The door cannot be opened from the inside.

The May 7, 2003 GSA application describes the facility as having maximum male occupancy of approximately 20 and female occupancy of approximately 35, a sally port for secure vehicle entry, and “detention grade walls, doors, hardware, and fixtures.” The security features (Federal Protective Service design standards, boulders, planters, berms, CMU walls) confirm a hardened facility designed for involuntary confinement.

The people held in this room are our mothers, family, friends, and neighbors. They have shared their stories: apprehended during a traffic stop, while leaving home for work, while attending a court appearance. They arrive without notice, without their families’ knowledge, without needed medications, without the chance to arrange for their children. ICE is not required to report a detainee’s location for up to 48 hours. For many families, the first sign is silence: an unreturned call, an absence that cannot be explained.

5.5 The City’s Breach of Duty Is Negligence

5.5.1 The Legal Analysis

Negligence requires a duty, a breach, causation, and damages. The IBC, the IFC, and GSMC Title 060 establishes the duty: mandatory inspection and enforcement obligations that are not discretionary. The breach is documented: zero inspections in twenty-one years, no CO enforcement, two abandoned Orders to Comply, a 2016 contractor report never acted on, a yellow tag issued and then ignored, and a repair list rather than a closure order when conditions were finally inspected. The same below-standard decision was made repeatedly: initiate enforcement, receive no compliance, abandon the action.

5.5.2 Partnership, Not Oversight

The City’s relationship with the federal tenant was not arms-length regulatory oversight; it was active operational partnership. On September 24, 2025, HSI Special Agent Christopher Carter forwarded surveillance imagery and a second-by-second movement log of a community member to SPEAR Intelligence Analyst Laura Horsey at the Garfield County Sheriff’s Office. The person’s activity: asking a cleaning person whether the building housed ICE or ATF. Horsey distributed this to forty-seven law enforcement recipients, including GSPD, under the subject line “Suspicious Activity at Federal Building.”

Three months earlier, HSI Special Agent Sarah Vasquez emailed GSPD Officer Michael Prough a screenshot of a Facebook post organizing a constitutionally protected community protest, with the note: “Great chatting with you.” No threat assessment, no safety concern, no criminal activity. The casual tone confirms an established coordination relationship. One arm of the City was partnering with the tenant on surveillance and protest monitoring; another had issued, and then abandoned, two enforcement orders against the same facility.

5.6 Congressional Oversight Was Denied

On March 11, 2026, Representative Joe Neguse traveled to 100 Midland Avenue carrying a federal court order from Neguse et al. v. ICE authorizing unannounced oversight visits. He attempted entry at both entrances. No one responded. No one answered by phone.

The City holds mandatory inspection authority under GSMC Title 060 and the IFC. That authority requires no court order and no federal permission. The City did not exercise it for twenty-one years. Its first documented visit came only after residents raised the issue publicly. A member of Congress with a court order could not enter. The City, which needed no court order, never tried.

The federal oversight mechanisms that should have caught these conditions were themselves dismantled. In March 2025, DHS issued Reduction in Force notices to nearly all staff at the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman, cutting those offices by 80 and 96 percent, respectively. The federal oversight system that existed when the deficiencies were documented had been effectively eliminated by the time they became public.

Section 6. What This Collective Is Asking the City to Do

The following actions are required by the building and fire codes the City has adopted. They are the same actions the City would be obligated to take for any other Group I-3 occupancy operating under equivalent conditions.

NECESSARY ACTION	DESCRIPTION
ISSUE A CLOSURE ORDER FOR SUITES 110 AND 210	Immediately issue a Closure Order. As demonstrated in Part IV, the City’s proposed remedies do not bring this space into Group I-3 compliance in any of the nine material categories examined. The legally required response under IBC Section 116.1 is cessation of occupancy until a final CO is obtained through a complete independent inspection applying I-3 standards throughout.
ACCOUNT FOR THE PEOPLE DETAINED	The City should provide, to the extent records exist, a complete count of individuals detained at this facility during its twenty-year operation and a statement of what oversight, if any, was exercised during that period. The people detained here are our neighbors
RELEASE THE FULL INSPECTION RECORD IMMEDIATELY	Release the complete February 25, 2026 inspection report, field notes, photographs, the fire marshal’s written assessment, and timeline for compliance. The post-inspection email to the tenant is not a substitute.
RELEASE THE MAY 2003 P&Z HEARING MINUTES	Release the minutes in their entirety ,including the record of any commissioner vote or participation in the SUP No. 4-04 approval.
REQUIRE KARL HANLON TO MAKE A FORMAL CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST DISCLOSURE TO THE CITY COUNCIL.	He has professional history directly connected to every stage of the original approval of this facility and the compliance period that followed. His firm, Karp Neu Hanlon, P.C., represents multiple municipalities and private development clients in the region whose interests may be affected by the precedent set in this matter.
RETAIN INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE COUNSEL IMMEDIATELY	<p>Independent outside counsel is required for all legal analysis, enforcement proceedings, and anticipated litigation related to 100 midland avenue.</p> <p>The City Attorney’s personal history with this facility, his firm’s regional municipal client portfolio, his narrowing of the April 28 hearing scope to exclude building code and fire code violations, and his instruction to Council members not to engage publicly on this matter collectively disqualify him from providing independent legal advice. Independent counsel should evaluate all enforcement paths under GSMC Titles 060 and 070, the IBC, the IFC, and applicable NFPA standards, not only the hold-time violation that Hanlon has selected as the sole issue for the April 28 hearing.</p>
CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT BUILDING INSPECTION APPLYING GROUP I-3 STANDARDS THROUGHOUT ALL NINE CATEGORIES IDENTIFIED IN PART IV.	An independent inspection that applies the appropriate standards is required. The inspector should have no prior professional or personal relationship with any official involved in the 2003-2005 approval or subsequent compliance history.
REVIEW THE SPECIAL USE PERMIT FOR CHANGED CONDITIONS.	As demonstrated in Part II, every material element of the 2003 compatibility determination has changed: the corridor land uses, the pedestrian bridge, the RFTA transit density, the traffic infrastructure, the operational hold-time limit (from the 12 hours represented in the 2003 application to 72 hours today), the detention volume, and the incident volume at the address (which nearly tripled in the most recent year of available data). A full Special Use Permit review before the Planning and Zoning Commission, with public notice and the opportunity for community comment on the record, is required by UDC Title 070.
RELEASE ALL BRYCER COMPLIANCE ENGINE RECORDS FOR 100 MIDLAND AVENUE.	The City’s own compliance platform contains a complete audit trail of when Orders to Comply were issued, to whom they were sent, and whether proof of correction was submitted. These records, including the first Order to Comply (approximately March 14, 2025) and the second Order to Comply (May 12, 2025), must be made public.

<p>RELEASE THE COMPLETE BUILDING PERMIT FILE FOR PERMIT NO. 04-0113</p>	<p>including the full building permit conditions list, all inspection records, and all correspondence related to the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy and its extension. The community is entitled to see the more than twenty pages of conditions the City identified in 2004, and to compare them against the five-item repair list the City produced in 2026.</p>
<p>DISCLOSE THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE COORDINATION</p>	<p>Disclose and document any coordination between The Glenwood Springs Police Department and the federal tenant ICE/HSI. The CORA production reveals that GSPD received protest monitoring alerts from HSI (June 2025) and participated in the SPEAR intelligence distribution regarding surveillance of a community member (September 2025). The City should explain what formal or informal agreements, if any, govern this coordination, and whether the City Council was informed of or authorized it.</p>

APPENDIX: SOURCE INDEX AND FACTUAL BASIS

100 Midland Avenue, Glenwood Springs, Colorado

Prepared: March 24, 2026

Revised: CORA Production URLs Integrated

I. CITY OF GLENWOOD SPRINGS CORA PRODUCTION INDEX

The following CORA production sets are hosted on the City of Glenwood Springs website and are referenced throughout this appendix by short label. Each factual claim in Section II identifies the specific CORA production set from which its underlying document was obtained.

Short Label	Production Description	Contents / Relevance	City URL
<p>CORA: P&Z Records</p>	<p>21026_Stahl_CORA_PZ</p>	<p>SUP No. 4-04 approval history; P&Z hearing records; Physical File Set including GSA application letter, Sundesigns memos, Biggers/Peterson correspondence, permit conditions, SUP approval page with Hanlon signature, Sanitation District fax</p>	<p>View</p>
<p>CORA: Email Correspondence</p>	<p>21026_Stahl_CORA_emails</p>	<p>City-HSI-GSA emails Feb. 2026; Hyatt/Brumbaugh correspondence; Gillespie/Workman/Hyatt chain; Boyd BCC; Hanlon on CC for CO remediation emails Feb. 24-25, 2026; retroactive CO approach</p>	<p>View</p>
<p>CORA: Fire Inspection Records</p>	<p>21026_Stahl_CORA_Fire-Insp</p>	<p>NID 9290456 and NID 9683590 (Orders to Comply); SimplexGrinnell NFPA 25 Deficiency Report July 25, 2016; confirms zero annual inspections 2004-2025</p>	<p>View</p>
<p>CORA: Occupancy Records</p>	<p>21026_Stahl_CORA_Occupancy</p>	<p>CO records; confirms no final CO issued; TCO dated Dec. 14, 2004 with expiration Sept. 1, 2005; post-inspection letter Feb. 25, 2026</p>	<p>View</p>
<p>CORA: Midland Parcels</p>	<p>12926_Noone_CORA_Midland Parcels</p>	<p>Parcel records and ownership history for 100 Midland Avenue</p>	<p>View</p>

CORA: Supplementary (Haynes)	11826_Haynes_CORA	Additional City records related to 100 Midland Avenue	View
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II. FACTUAL CLAIMS, PRIMARY SOURCES, AND CORA CITATIONS

Each row identifies the factual claim, its primary source document, its provenance category, and a hyperlink to the specific City CORA production set where the underlying document can be found. Where the document was obtained from a non-City CORA source, this is noted.

A. Building, Permit, and Fire Safety

Factual Claim	Primary Source	Provenance	CORA Production
Zero inspections 2004-2025; exit lights failed; sprinklers untested; holes above heater	City post-inspection letter, Feb. 25, 2026; Post Independent, March 5, 2026	Occupancy Records; Public news	CORA: Occupancy Records
Four impairment-level sprinkler deficiencies identified March 5, 2025	NID 9290456 (~March 14, 2025); NID 9683590 (May 12, 2025)	Fire Inspection Records	CORA: Fire Inspection Records
Two Orders to Comply issued; no proof of correction received	NID 9290456; NID 9683590 (signed by Fire Marshal Pitt)	Fire Inspection Records	CORA: Fire Inspection Records
2016 private contractor found fire protection deficiencies inside DHS holding facility	SimplexGrinnell NFPA 25 Deficiency Report, Midland Center Bldg. 1, July 25, 2016	Fire Inspection Records	CORA: Fire Inspection Records
Building permit conditions: 20+ pages including Group I Occupancy provisions IO-1 through IO-18	Permit No. 04-0113, Building Permit Conditions List	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Exterior lighting details required "prior to final inspection" per handwritten notations	Permit File, handwritten notes dated May 10 and May 17, 2004	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Sanitation District required \$9,885 in remaining tap fees before TCO/CO could be issued	West Glenwood Springs Sanitation District fax, June 28, 2004	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Original GC Mueller Construction closed 2025; no records from 2004-2005 buildout	CORA email: Gillespie to Workman, Feb. 24, 2026	Email Correspondence	CORA: Email Correspondence
Lessor Jeffrey Gillespie / JG Housing Solutions LLC, Tampa Bay, FL	CORA email: Workman to Hyatt, Feb. 24, 2026	Email Correspondence	CORA: Email Correspondence

B. Special Use Permit and Evacuation Plan

Factual Claim	Primary Source	Provenance	CORA Production
SUP No. 4-04 approved May 27, 2003; permit 04-0113; TCO B/I-3	City post-inspection letter; Physical File Set	Occupancy Records; P&Z Records	CORA: Occupancy Records
Original SUP application represented 12-hour maximum hold time; ~60 persons; co-occupancy with TRIDENT	Russell Fury (GSA) letter to Jill Peterson, May 7, 2003	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Evacuation plan required as SUP condition; Nov. 20, 2003 meeting with Fire Chief established protocols	Sundesigns Architects memo, May 4, 2004 (re: Nov. 20, 2003 meeting)	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records

Evacuation plan approved in writing by Fire Department	Ron Biggers letter to Jill Peterson, May 13, 2004	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
City Planner requested written confirmation of evacuation plan for planning file	Jill Peterson memo to Ron Biggers, May 5, 2004	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Knox-box with keys to holding room agreed as emergency access protocol	Sundesigns memo, May 4, 2004 (Nov. 20, 2003 meeting notes)	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Hanlon signature on SUP No. 4-04, May 17, 2004	Physical File Set, SUP approval page	P&Z / Physical File Set	CORA: P&Z Records
Only current emergency document is generic GSA poster; no fire evacuation plan for restrained occupants	GSA "Know the Plan of Action" poster (OneDrive screenshot; 562 area code)	On-Site / Direct Observation	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Replacement "Occupant Emergency Plan" submitted March 2026: wrong address (120 not 100); generic GSA template; seven words of detention-specific guidance	GSA Occupant Emergency Plan, Building CO1935ZZ (photograph)	On-Site / Direct Observation	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>

C. Detention Operations and Federal Policy

Factual Claim	Primary Source	Provenance	CORA Production
ICE hold room limit extended from 12 hours to 72 hours on June 24, 2025	ICE Nationwide Hold Room Waiver memorandum; IPTP Policy ID 1970; D.N.N. v. Baker	Public: Federal policy	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Glenwood Springs hold room (GSCHOLD) housed 73 detainees Jan.-Oct. 2025; 45% with no criminal record	Colorado Times Recorder, March 19, 2026 (Deportation Data Project FOIA)	Public: News (FOIA data)	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Incident volume at 100 Midland nearly tripled: 54 (Year 1) to 156 (Year 2)	GSPD incident search data, Kimminau, Nov. 20, 2024; Waters request Nov. 19, 2024	CORA: GCSO/GSPD (separate)	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
DHS internal oversight agencies (CRCL, OIDO) dismantled March 2025; staff cut 80% and 96%	"Denouncing Into the Void," WOLA/Kino, March 19, 2026	Public: Policy report	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Neguse denied access March 11, 2026	Office of Rep. Neguse, press release, March 11, 2026	Public: Congressional press release	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>

D. SPEAR Task Force and Surveillance

Factual Claim	Primary Source	Provenance	CORA Production
SPEAR Intelligence Analyst Horsey distributed surveillance to 47 named law enforcement recipients	CORA email: Horsey to GCSO/GSPD distribution, Sept. 24, 2025	CORA: GCSO/GSPD (separate)	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
HSI Special Agent Carter provided minute-by-minute surveillance of e-bike rider	CORA email: Carter to Horsey, Sept. 24, 2025	CORA: GCSO/GSPD (separate)	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
HSI Special Agent Vasquez alerted GSPD to planned community protest	CORA email: Vasquez to Prough (GSPD), June 10, 2025	CORA: GCSO/GSPD (separate)	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>

Note: The SPEAR/surveillance emails and GSPD incident data in Sections C and D were obtained through CORA requests to the Garfield County Sheriff's Office and Glenwood Springs Police Department. These documents are not part of the City's published Stahl or Noone production sets linked above. They are maintained by The Noone Law Firm and referenced in the Towards Justice cease-and-desist letter ([PDF](#)).

E. City Response and Conflict of Interest

Factual Claim	Primary Source	Provenance	CORA Production
City "taking heat"; retroactive CO approach	CORA email: Hyatt to Brumbaugh, Feb. 23, 2026, 9:29 AM	Email Correspondence	CORA: Email Correspondence
City Manager Boyd blind-copied on initial Feb. 18 HSI outreach	CORA email: Hyatt to Brumbaugh, Feb. 18, 2026 (BCC: Boyd, Pitt, Meraz)	Email Correspondence	CORA: Email Correspondence
Hanlon copied on CO remediation emails Feb. 24 and 25, 2026	CORA email production	Email Correspondence	CORA: Email Correspondence
Hanlon served as City Attorney 2000-2005, returned 2015	Vail Daily; CORA email production	Public news; Email Correspondence	CORA: Email Correspondence
No formal notice of violation issued as of March 19, 2026; notice and P&Z hearing announced same date	Hanlon and Boyd, March 19, 2026 City Council meeting	Public meeting record	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Hanlon announced hearing scope limited to hold-time violation; scheduled April 28, 2026 at 6 PM	March 19, 2026 City Council meeting; GSMC Section 070.010.080	Public meeting record	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Hanlon instructed Council not to engage with public speakers; cited litigation strategy	March 19, 2026 City Council meeting	Public meeting record	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
No conflict disclosure by Hanlon	Absence from all CORA and City public communications, as of March 22, 2026	Negative finding	CORA: Email Correspondence
Boyd: "no evidence unsafe"; "fair, transparent, consistent"	City Manager Boyd statement, March 5, 2026	Public: City press release	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>
Karp Neu Hanlon serves as counsel to Rifle, Collbran, New Castle, Salida, others	mountainlawfirm.com; Lawyers.com	Public: Firm website	<i>N/A (see notes)</i>

III. HYPERLINKED PUBLIC SOURCES

URLs verified as of March 24, 2026.

A. News Coverage

Source	URL
Post Independent: CO issue (March 5, 2026)	https://www.postindependent.com/news/city-of-glenwood-springs-inspecting-ice-office-after-missing-occupancy-certificate-discovered/
Post Independent: Feb. 19 Council	https://www.postindependent.com/news/glenwood-springs-city-council-hears-concerns-about-ice-office-discusses-events-approves-property-negotiations-and-more/
Post Independent: March 5 Council	https://www.postindependent.com/news/glenwood-springs-city-council-hears-renewed-ice-concerns-explores-employee-housing-option-and-more/

Post Independent: March 19 enforcement process	https://www.postindependent.com/news/glenwood-springs-begins-enforcement-process-over-ice-detention-facility-permit/
Aspen Journalism: Hold time / SUP analysis	https://aspenjournalism.org/city-could-revoke-permit-after-data-shows-ice-detainees-held-for-more-than-12-hours-at-glenwood-facility/
Aspen Public Radio: Same	https://www.aspenpublicradio.org/social-justice/2026-03-17/city-could-revoke-permit-after-data-shows-that-ice-detained-people-for-more-than-12-hours-at-glenwood-facility
CO Times Recorder: Secret ICE facilities	https://coloradotimesrecorder.com/2026/03/exclusive-secret-ice-detention-facilities-exist-around-colorado-data-shows/76983/
CO Times Recorder: ICE confirms reporting	https://coloradotimesrecorder.com/2026/03/davis-ice-confirms-ctr-reporting-in-denial/77248/
Sopris Sun: Permit lapse alleged	https://soprissun.com/glenwood-report-permit-lapse-alleged-for-glenwood-ice-facility-city-response-coming/

B. Congressional Oversight

Source	URL
Post Independent: Neguse oversight visit	https://www.postindependent.com/news/u-s-rep-neguse-attempts-oversight-visit-at-glenwood-springs-ice-office/
Neguse: Court restores oversight	https://neguse.house.gov/media/press-releases/court-again-orders-trump-vance-administration-restore-congressional-oversight
CBS Colorado: Lawmakers question holding cells	https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/democratic-lawmakers-immigration-customs-enforcement-holding-cells-suboffices/
KUNC: Democrats question ICE director	https://www.kunc.org/2026-03-15/colorado-democrats-question-ice-director-over-extended-detentions-in-holding-cells

C. Towards Justice / SPEAR

Source	URL
Cease-and-desist letter (full PDF)	https://towardsjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Cease_and_Desist_GCSO.pdf
Aspen Journalism: C&D coverage	https://aspenjournalism.org/law-firm-sends-cess-and-desist-letter-to-garfield-county-sheriff-over-alleged-unlawful-immigration-enforcement/
Post Independent: Sheriff served C&D	https://www.postindependent.com/news/garfield-county-sheriffs-office-served-cess-and-desist-letter-for-allegedly-assisting-ice/
Denver Post: Sheriff accused	https://www.denverpost.com/2026/02/26/garfield-county-sheriff-immigration-ice-cooperation/

D. Federal Policy and Detention Standards

Source	URL
ICE Hold Room Waiver (PDF)	https://iptp-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/2025.06.24_ICE_-_Nationwide_Hold_Room_Waiver.pdf
IPTP Policy ID 1970	https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/ice-waives-the-12-hour-holding-cell-limit-allowing-detainees-to-be-held-for-72-hours/
WOLA/Kino: Denouncing Into the Void	https://www.wola.org/analysis/denouncing-into-the-void-the-dismantling-of-internal-oversight-and-accountability-at-dhs/

E. Karp Neu Hanlon / Conflict of Interest

Source	URL
Firm website	https://www.mountainlawfirm.com/
Karl J. Hanlon profile	https://www.mountainlawfirm.com/attorneys/karl-j-hanlon/
Lawyers.com: Client list	https://www.lawyers.com/glenwood-springs/colorado/karp-neu-hanlon-p-c-309246-f/

IV. PRESS RELEASES AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

A. Office of Rep. Joe Neguse

Press release, March 11, 2026 (attempted oversight visit at 100 Midland Ave.; denied access). Neguse press releases page: neguse.house.gov/media/press-releases.

Colorado Congressional Delegation letter to Acting ICE Director Lyons, March 11, 2026 (led by Rep. Pettersen). Referenced in [CO Times Recorder](#) and [CBS Colorado](#).

32 state lawmakers letter to ICE/DHS, March 5, 2026 (including Rep. Velasco). Referenced in Aspen Journalism reporting.

B. City of Glenwood Springs

City press release, ~March 5, 2026 ("Clarification regarding Suites 110 and 210"). Listed on cogs.us. Reported: [Post Independent](#).

Hanlon and Boyd, March 19, 2026 City Council (enforcement process; April 28 hearing). Reported: [Post Independent](#).

C. Towards Justice

Cease-and-desist letter, Feb. 25-26, 2026. Full PDF: towardsjustice.org.

D. Federal Agency Statements

ICE spokesperson, March 12, 2026: declined to comment on "unverified data." Referenced in [Aspen Journalism](#).

ICE Denver (@ERODenver) on X, March 11, 2026: claimed hold rooms are "sub-offices." Referenced in [KOOA](#).

GSA spokesperson, March 11, 2026: "remains committed to working with all partner agencies." Quoted in Aspen Journalism.

Colorado AG's Office, ~Feb. 2026: confirmed complaints are reviewed; declined to confirm investigations. Referenced in [Aspen Journalism](#).

V. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Citation	Description
IBC (2021)	International Building Code, 2021 edition
IBC Section 308.5	Group I-3 Occupancy classification (restrained occupants)
IBC Section 408	Group I-3 specific requirements (smoke compartments, egress, evacuation)
IBC Section 903.2.6	Automatic sprinkler system required for Group I occupancies
IBC Section 907.2.6	Fire alarm and detection for Group I occupancies
IBC Section 1008.3	Emergency lighting requirements
IBC Section 116.1	Mandatory closure authority for unsafe structures
IFC Section 104.1	Fire code official inspection authority
IFC Section 404.2	Emergency evacuation plan for Group I-3
NFPA 13	Standard for Installation of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 25	Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection
NFPA 72	National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code

NEC Section 110.26	Working space requirements for electrical panels
GSMC Section 060.010	Certificate of Occupancy requirement
GSMC Section 070.010.080	SUP enforcement and revocation
GSMC Section 070.030.030	Noncompliance as grounds for permit revocation ("shall")
Colorado RPC Rule 1.7	Conflict of interest (concurrent conflicts)
HB 19-1124	Prohibits arrest/detention based solely on civil immigration detainer
SB 21-131	Restricts state agency disclosure for immigration enforcement
SB 25-276	Limits local law enforcement collaboration with ICE (May 2025)
ICE PBNDS Section 2.6	Hold room operations (2011, rev. 2016); prior 12-hour standard
ICE NDS (revised 2025)	National Detention Standards

VI. PROVENANCE KEY

Category	Description
CORA: P&Z Records	SUP application, P&Z hearing materials, physical planning/permit file documents including architect memos, Fire Department correspondence, permit conditions, SUP approval page. Hosted at City URL above.
CORA: Email Correspondence	City-HSI-GSA email chain Feb. 2026; internal City communications; Hanlon CC'd emails. Hosted at City URL above.
CORA: Fire Inspection Records	NID enforcement documents, SimplexGrinnell 2016 report, inspection history confirming zero annual inspections. Hosted at City URL above.
CORA: Occupancy Records	TCO, CO absence confirmation, post-inspection letter Feb. 25, 2026. Hosted at City URL above.
CORA: Midland Parcels	Parcel records and ownership history. Hosted at City URL above.
CORA: Supplementary (Haynes)	Additional City records related to 100 Midland Avenue. Hosted at City URL above.
CORA: GCSO/GSPD (separate)	SPEAR/surveillance emails and GSPD incident data obtained through separate CORA requests to GCSO and GSPD. Not part of City published sets. Maintained by The Noone Law Firm.
On-Site / Direct Observation	Documents and conditions documented through photographs at the facility (GSA poster, replacement evacuation plan).
Public: News	Published news reporting from identified outlets.
Public: Federal policy	Federal memoranda, standards, and litigation filings available through government or policy tracking websites.
Public: Congressional press release	Official statements from congressional offices.
Public: City press release	Official statements issued by the City of Glenwood Springs.
Public: Policy report	Published reports from policy organizations.
Public: Firm website	Information on law firm websites and legal directories.
Public meeting record	City Council statements available through minutes, video, or news reporting.
Negative finding	Absence confirmed through comprehensive CORA and public record review.

This appendix is prepared as a reference index. All hyperlinks verified as of March 24, 2026. The City of Glenwood Springs hosts CORA production sets.

